CHAPTER IX. OF THE ENDS OF POLITICAL SOCIETY AND GOVERNMENT.
Sect. 123.
IF
man
in
the
state
of
nature
be
so
free,
as
has been said;
if
he
be
absolute
lord
of
his
own
person
and
possessions, equal
to
the
greatest,
and
subject
to
no
body,
why
will
he
part
with
his
freedom?
why
will
he
give
up
this
empire,
and
subject
himself
to
the
dominion
and
controul
of
any
other
power?
To
which
it
is
obvious
to
answer,
that
though
in
the
state
of
nature
he
hath
such
a right,
yet
the
enjoyment
of
it
is
very
uncertain,
and
constantly
exposed
to
the
invasion
of
others:
for
all
being kings
as
much
as
he,
every
man
his
equal,
and
the
greater
part
no
strict
observers
of
equity
and
justice,
the
enjoyment
of
the
property
he
has
in
this
state
is
very
unsafe,
very
unsecure.
This
makes
him
willing
to
quit
a condition, which, however free,
is
full
of
fears
and
continual
dangers:
and
it
is
not
without
reason,
that
he
seeks
out,
and
is
willing
to
join
in
society
with
others,
who
are
already
united,
or
have
a
mind
to
unite,
for
the
mutual
preservation
of
their
lives,
liberties
and
estates,
which
I
call
by
the
general
name, property. Sect. 124.
The
great
and
chief
end, therefore,
of
men's
uniting
into
commonwealths,
and
putting
themselves
under
government,
is
the
preservation
of
their
property.
To
which
in
the
state
of
nature
there
are
many
things
wanting. First,
There
wants
an
established, settled, known law, received
and
allowed
by
common
consent
to
be
the
standard
of
right
and
wrong,
and
the
common
measure
to
decide
all
controversies
between
them:
for
though
the
law
of
nature
be
plain
and
intelligible
to
all
rational
creatures;
yet
men being biassed
by
their
interest,
as
well
as
ignorant
for
want
of
study
of
it,
are
not
apt
to
allow
of
it
as
a
law
binding
to
them
in
the
application
of
it
to
their
particular
cases. Sect. 125. Secondly,
In
the
state
of
nature
there
wants
a known
and
indifferent
judge,
with
authority
to
determine
all
differences
according
to
the
established
law:
for
every
one
in
that
state
being
both
judge
and
executioner
of
the
law
of
nature, men being
partial
to
themselves,
passion
and
revenge
is
very
apt
to
carry
them
too
far,
and
with
too
much
heat,
in
their
own
cases;
as
well
as
negligence,
and
unconcernedness,
to
make
them
too
remiss
in
other
men's. Sect. 126. Thirdly,
In
the
state
of
nature
there
often
wants
power
to
back
and
support
the
sentence
when
right,
and
to
give
it
due
execution,
They
who
by
any
injustice
offended,
will
seldom
fail,
where
they
are
able,
by
force
to
make
good
their
injustice;
such
resistance
many
times
makes
the
punishment
dangerous,
and
frequently destructive,
to
those
who
attempt it. Sect. 127.
Thus
mankind,
notwithstanding
all
the
privileges
of
the
state
of
nature, being
but
in
an
ill
condition,
while
they
remain
in
it,
are
quickly
driven
into
society.
Hence
it
comes
to
pass,
that
we
seldom
find
any
number
of
men
live
any
time
together
in
this
state.
The
inconveniencies
that
they
are
therein
exposed
to,
by
the
irregular
and
uncertain
exercise
of
the
power
every
man
has
of
punishing
the
transgressions
of
others,
make
them
take
sanctuary
under
the
established
laws
of
government,
and
therein
seek
the
preservation
of
their
property.
It
is
this
makes
them
so
willingly
give
up
every
one
his
single power
of
punishing,
to
be
exercised
by
such
alone,
as
shall
be
appointed
to
it
amongst
them;
and
by
such
rules
as
the
community,
or
those
authorized
by
them
to
that
purpose,
shall
agree
on.
And
in
this
we
have
the
original
right
and
rise
of
both
the
legislative
and
executive
power,
as
well
as
of
the
governments
and
societies
themselves. Sect. 128.
For
in
the
state
of
nature,
to
omit
the
liberty
he
has
of
innocent
delights, a
man
has
two
powers.
The
first
is
to
do
whatsoever
he
thinks
fit
for
the
preservation
of
himself,
and
others
within
the
permission
of
the
law
of
nature:
by
which
law,
common
to
them
all,
he
and
all
the
rest
of
mankind
are
one
community,
make
up
one
society,
distinct
from
all
other
creatures.
And
were
it
not
for
the
corruption
and
vitiousness
of
degenerate
men,
there
would
be
no
need
of
any
other;
no
necessity
that
men
should
separate
from
this
great
and
natural
community,
and
by
positive
agreements
combine
into
smaller
and
divided
associations.
The
other
power a
man
has
in
the
state
of
nature,
is
the
power
to
punish
the
crimes
committed against
that
law.
Both
these
he
gives
up,
when
he
joins
in
a private,
if
I
may
so
call
it,
or
particular
politic society,
and
incorporates
into
any
commonwealth,
separate
from
the
rest
of
mankind. Sect. 129.
The
first
power, viz.
of
doing whatsoever
he
thought
for
the
preservation
of
himself,
and
the
rest
of
mankind,
he
gives
up
to
be
regulated
by
laws
made
by
the
society,
so
far
forth
as
the
preservation
of
himself,
and
the
rest
of
that
society
shall
require;
which
laws
of
the
society
in
many
things
confine
the
liberty
he
had
by
the
law
of
nature. Sect. 130. Secondly,
The
power
of
punishing
he
wholly
gives
up,
and
engages
his
natural
force, (which
he
might
before
employ
in
the
execution
of
the
law
of
nature,
by
his
own
single authority,
as
he
thought
fit)
to
assist
the
executive
power
of
the
society,
as
the
law
thereof
shall
require:
for
being
now
in
a
new
state,
wherein
he
is
to
enjoy
many
conveniencies,
from
the
labour, assistance,
and
society
of
others
in
the
same
community,
as
well
as
protection
from
its
whole
strength;
he
is
to
part
also
with
as
much
of
his
natural
liberty,
in
providing
for
himself,
as
the
good, prosperity,
and
safety
of
the
society
shall
require;
which
is
not
only
necessary,
but
just,
since
the
other
members
of
the
society
do
the
like. Sect. 131.
But
though
men,
when
they
enter
into
society,
give
up
the
equality, liberty,
and
executive
power
they
had
in
the
state
of
nature,
into
the
hands
of
the
society,
to
be
so
far
disposed
of
by
the
legislative,
as
the
good
of
the
society
shall
require;
yet
it
being
only
with
an
intention
in
every
one
the
better
to
preserve himself,
his
liberty
and
property; (for
no
rational
creature
can
be
supposed
to
change
his
condition
with
an
intention
to
be
worse)
the
power
of
the
society,
or
legislative
constituted
by
them,
can
never
be
supposed
to
extend
farther,
than
the
common
good;
but
is
obliged
to
secure
every
one's property,
by
providing
against
those
three
defects
above
mentioned,
that
made
the
state
of
nature
so
unsafe
and
uneasy.
And
so
whoever
has
the
legislative
or
supreme
power
of
any
commonwealth,
is
bound
to
govern
by
established
standing laws,
promulgated
and
known
to
the
people,
and
not
by
extemporary decrees;
by
indifferent
and
upright
judges,
who
are
to
decide
controversies
by
those
laws;
and
to
employ
the
force
of
the
community
at
home,
only
in
the
execution
of
such
laws,
or
abroad
to
prevent
or
redress
foreign
injuries,
and
secure
the
community
from
inroads
and
invasion.
And
all
this
to
be
directed
to
no
other
end,
but
the
peace, safety,
and
public
good
of
the
people.