CHAPTER XII. OF THE LEGISLATIVE, EXECUTIVE, AND FEDERATIVE POWER OF THE COMMON-WEALTH.
Sect. 143.
THE
legislative power
is
that,
which
has a
right
to
direct
how
the
force
of
the
commonwealth
shall
be
employed
for
preserving
the
community
and
the
members
of
it.
But
because
those
laws
which
are
constantly
to
be
executed,
and
whose
force
is
always
to
continue,
may
be
made
in
a
little
time;
therefore
there
is
no
need,
that
the
legislative
should
be
always
in
being,
not
having
always
business
to
do.
And
because
it
may
be
too
great
a
temptation
to
human
frailty,
apt
to
grasp
at
power,
for
the
same
persons,
who
have
the
power
of
making
laws,
to
have
also
in
their
hands
the
power
to
execute
them, whereby
they
may
exempt
themselves
from
obedience
to
the
laws
they
make,
and
suit
the
law,
both
in
its
making,
and
execution,
to
their
own
private
advantage,
and
thereby
come
to
have
a
distinct
interest
from
the
rest
of
the
community,
contrary
to
the
end
of
society
and
government:
therefore
in
wellordered commonwealths,
where
the
good
of
the
whole
is
so
considered,
as
it
ought,
the
legislative power
is
put
into
the
hands
of
divers
persons,
who
duly assembled,
have
by
themselves,
or
jointly
with
others, a power
to
make
laws,
which
when
they
have
done, being separated again,
they
are
themselves
subject
to
the
laws
they
have
made;
which
is
a
new
and
near
tie
upon
them,
to
take
care,
that
they
make
them
for
the
public good. Sect. 144.
But
because
the
laws,
that
are
at
once,
and
in
a
short
time made,
have
a constant
and
lasting
force,
and
need
a
perpetual
execution,
or
an
attendance
thereunto;
therefore
it
is
necessary
there
should
be
a power
always
in
being,
which
should
see
to
the
execution
of
the
laws
that
are
made,
and
remain
in
force.
And
thus
the
legislative
and
executive
power
come
often
to
be
separated. Sect. 145.
There
is
another
power
in
every
commonwealth,
which
one
may
call
natural,
because
it
is
that
which
answers
to
the
power
every
man
naturally had
before
he
entered
into
society:
for
though
in
a commonwealth
the
members
of
it
are
distinct
persons
still
in
reference
to
one
another,
and
as
such
as
governed
by
the
laws
of
the
society;
yet
in
reference
to
the
rest
of
mankind,
they
make
one
body,
which
is,
as
every
member
of
it
before
was,
still
in
the
state
of
nature
with
the
rest
of
mankind.
Hence
it
is,
that
the
controversies
that
happen
between
any
man
of
the
society
with
those
that
are
out
of
it,
are
managed
by
the
public;
and
an
injury
done
to
a
member
of
their
body,
engages
the
whole
in
the
reparation
of
it.
So
that
under
this
consideration,
the
whole
community
is
one
body
in
the
state
of
nature,
in
respect
of
all
other
states
or
persons
out
of
its
community. Sect. 146.
This
therefore
contains
the
power
of
war
and
peace, leagues
and
alliances,
and
all
the
transactions,
with
all
persons
and
communities
without
the
commonwealth,
and
may
be
called
federative,
if
any
one
pleases.
So
the
thing
be
understood, I
am
indifferent
as
to
the
name. Sect. 147.
These
two
powers,
executive
and
federative,
though
they
be
really
distinct
in
themselves,
yet
one
comprehending
the
execution
of
the
municipal
laws
of
the
society
within
its
self,
upon
all
that
are
parts
of
it;
the
other
the
management
of
the
security
and
interest
of
the
public without,
with
all
those
that
it
may
receive
benefit
or
damage
from,
yet
they
are
always
almost
united.
And
though
this
federative power
in
the
well
or
ill
management
of
it
be
of
great
moment
to
the
commonwealth,
yet
it
is
much
less
capable
to
be
directed
by
antecedent, standing, positive laws,
than
the
executive;
and
so
must
necessarily
be
left
to
the
prudence
and
wisdom
of
those,
whose
hands
it
is
in,
to
be
managed
for
the
public good:
for
the
laws
that
concern
subjects
one
amongst
another, being
to
direct
their
actions,
may
well
enough
precede
them.
But
what
is
to
be
done
in
reference
to
foreigners,
depending
much
upon
their
actions,
and
the
variation
of
designs
and
interests,
must
be
left
in
great
part
to
the
prudence
of
those,
who
have
this
power committed
to
them,
to
be
managed
by
the
best
of
their
skill,
for
the
advantage
of
the
commonwealth. Sect. 148. Though,
as
I said,
the
executive
and
federative power
of
every
community
be
really
distinct
in
themselves,
yet
they
are
hardly
to
be
separated,
and
placed
at
the
same
time,
in
the
hands
of
distinct
persons:
for
both
of
them
requiring
the
force
of
the
society
for
their
exercise,
it
is
almost
impracticable
to
place
the
force
of
the
commonwealth
in
distinct,
and
not
subordinate hands;
or
that
the
executive
and
federative power
should
be
placed
in
persons,
that
might
act
separately, whereby
the
force
of
the
public
would
be
under
different
commands:
which
would
be
apt
some
time
or
other
to
cause
disorder
and
ruin.