Sect. 16.
THE
state
of
war
is
a
state
of
enmity
and
destruction:
and
therefore
declaring
by
word
or
action,
not
a
passionate
and
hasty,
but
a sedate settled
design
upon
another
man's life,
puts
him
in
a
state
of
war
with
him
against
whom
he
has
declared
such
an
intention,
and
so
has
exposed
his
life
to
the
other's power
to
be
taken
away
by
him,
or
any
one
that
joins
with
him
in
his
defence,
and
espouses
his
quarrel;
it
being
reasonable
and
just, I
should
have
a
right
to
destroy
that
which
threatens
me
with
destruction: for,
by
the
fundamental
law
of
nature,
man
being
to
be
preserved
as
much
as
possible,
when
all
cannot
be
preserved,
the
safety
of
the
innocent
is
to
be
preferred:
and
one
may
destroy
a
man
who
makes
war
upon
him,
or
has
discovered
an
enmity
to
his
being,
for
the
same
reason
that
he
may
kill a
wolf
or
a lion;
because
such
men
are
not
under
the
ties
of
the
commonlaw
of
reason,
have
no
other
rule,
but
that
of
force
and
violence,
and
so
may
be
treated
as
beasts
of
prey,
those
dangerous
and
noxious
creatures,
that
will
be
sure
to
destroy
him
whenever
he
falls
into
their
power. Sect. 17.
And
hence
it
is,
that
he
who
attempts
to
get
another
man
into
his
absolute
power,
does
thereby
put
himself
into
a
state
of
war
with
him;
it
being
to
be
understood
as
a
declaration
of
a
design
upon
his
life:
for
I
have
reason
to
conclude,
that
he
who
would
get
me
into
his
power
without
my consent,
would
use
me
as
he
pleased
when
he
had got
me
there,
and
destroy
me
too
when
he
had a fancy
to
it;
for
no
body
can
desire
to
have
me
in
his
absolute
power, unless
it
be
to
compel
me
by
force
to
that
which
is
against
the
right
of
my freedom, i.e.
make
me
a slave.
To
be
free
from
such
force
is
the
only
security
of
my preservation;
and
reason
bids
me
look
on
him,
as
an
enemy
to
my preservation,
who
would
take
away
that
freedom
which
is
the
fence
to
it;
so
that
he
who
makes
an
attempt
to
enslave me,
thereby
puts
himself
into
a
state
of
war
with
me.
He
that,
in
the
state
of
nature,
would
take
away
the
freedom
that
belongs
to
any
one
in
that
state,
must
necessarily
be
supposed
to
have
a
design
to
take
away
every
thing
else,
that
freedom
being
the
foundation
of
all
the
rest;
as
he
that,
in
the
state
of
society,
would
take
away
the
freedom
belonging
to
those
of
that
society
or
commonwealth,
must
be
supposed
to
design
to
take
away
from
them
every
thing
else,
and
so
be
looked
on
as
in
a
state
of
war. Sect. 18.
This
makes
it
lawful
for
a
man
to
kill a thief,
who
has
not
in
the
least
hurt him,
nor
declared
any
design
upon
his
life,
any
farther
than,
by
the
use
of
force,
so
to
get
him
in
his
power,
as
to
take
away
his
money,
or
what
he
pleases,
from
him;
because
using
force,
where
he
has
no
right,
to
get
me
into
his
power,
let
his
pretence
be
what
it
will, I
have
no
reason
to
suppose,
that
he,
who
would
take
away
my liberty,
would
not,
when
he
had
me
in
his
power,
take
away
every
thing
else.
And
therefore
it
is
lawful
for
me
to
treat
him
as
one
who
has
put
himself
into
a
state
of
war
with
me, i.e. kill
him
if
I can;
for
to
that
hazard
does
he
justly
expose
himself,
whoever
introduces
a
state
of
war,
and
is
aggressor
in
it. Sect. 19.
And
here
we
have
the
plain
difference
between
the
state
of
nature
and
the
state
of
war,
which
however
some
men
have
confounded,
are
as
far
distant,
as
a
state
of
peace,
good
will, mutual
assistance
and
preservation,
and
a
state
of
enmity, malice,
violence
and
mutual destruction,
are
one
from
another. Men
living
together
according
to
reason,
without
a
common
superior
on
earth,
with
authority
to
judge
between
them,
is
properly
the
state
of
nature.
But
force,
or
a
declared
design
of
force,
upon
the
person
of
another,
where
there
is
no
common
superior
on
earth
to
appeal
to
for
relief,
is
the
state
of
war:
and
it
is
the
want
of
such
an
appeal
gives
a
man
the
right
of
war
even
against
an
aggressor, tho'
he
be
in
society
and
a
fellow
subject.
Thus
a thief,
whom
I cannot harm,
but
by
appeal
to
the
law,
for
having
stolen
all
that
I
am
worth, I
may
kill,
when
he
sets
on
me
to
rob
me
but
of
my
horse
or
coat;
because
the
law,
which
was
made
for
my preservation,
where
it
cannot
interpose
to
secure my
life
from
present
force, which,
if
lost,
is
capable
of
no
reparation, permits
me
my
own
defence,
and
the
right
of
war, a
liberty
to
kill
the
aggressor,
because
the
aggressor
allows
not
time
to
appeal
to
our
common
judge,
nor
the
decision
of
the
law,
for
remedy
in
a
case
where
the
mischief
may
be
irreparable.
Want
of
a
common
judge
with
authority,
puts
all
men
in
a
state
of
nature:
force
without
right,
upon
a man's person,
makes
a
state
of
war,
both
where
there
is,
and
is
not, a
common
judge. Sect. 20.
But
when
the
actual
force
is
over,
the
state
of
war
ceases
between
those
that
are
in
society,
and
are
equally
on
both
sides
subjected
to
the
fair
determination
of
the
law;
because
then
there
lies
open
the
remedy
of
appeal
for
the
past injury,
and
to
prevent
future
harm:
but
where
no
such
appeal
is,
as
in
the
state
of
nature,
for
want
of
positive laws,
and
judges
with
authority
to
appeal
to,
the
state
of
war
once
begun, continues,
with
a
right
to
the
innocent
party
to
destroy
the
other
whenever
he
can,
until
the
aggressor
offers
peace,
and
desires
reconciliation
on
such
terms
as
may
repair
any
wrongs
he
has
already
done,
and
secure
the
innocent
for
the
future; nay,
where
an
appeal
to
the
law,
and
constituted
judges, lies open,
but
the
remedy
is
denied
by
a
manifest
perverting
of
justice,
and
a
barefaced
wresting
of
the
laws
to
protect
or
indemnify
the
violence
or
injuries
of
some
men,
or
party
of
men,
there
it
is
hard
to
imagine
any
thing
but
a
state
of
war:
for
wherever
violence
is
used,
and
injury
done,
though
by
hands
appointed
to
administer
justice,
it
is
still
violence
and
injury, however
coloured
with
the
name, pretences,
or
forms
of
law,
the
end
whereof
being
to
protect
and
redress
the
innocent,
by
an
unbiassed
application
of
it,
to
all
who
are
under
it; wherever
that
is
not
bona
fide done,
war
is
made
upon
the
sufferers,
who
having
no
appeal
on
earth
to
right
them,
they
are
left
to
the
only
remedy
in
such
cases,
an
appeal
to
heaven. Sect. 21.
To
avoid
this
state
of
war
(wherein
there
is
no
appeal
but
to
heaven,
and
wherein
every
the
least
difference
is
apt
to
end,
where
there
is
no
authority
to
decide
between
the
contenders)
is
one
great
reason
of
men's
putting
themselves
into
society,
and
quitting
the
state
of
nature:
for
where
there
is
an
authority, a power
on
earth,
from
which
relief
can
be
had
by
appeal,
there
the
continuance
of
the
state
of
war
is
excluded,
and
the
controversy
is
decided
by
that
power. Had
there
been
any
such
court,
any
superior
jurisdiction
on
earth,
to
determine
the
right
between
Jephtha
and
the
Ammonites,
they
had
never
come
to
a
state
of
war:
but
we
see
he
was
forced
to
appeal
to
heaven.
The
Lord
the
Judge
(says he)
be
judge
this
day
between
the
children
of
Israel
and
the
children
of
Ammon, Judg. xi. 27.
and
then
prosecuting,
and
relying
on
his
appeal,
he
leads
out
his
army
to
battle:
and
therefore
in
such
controversies,
where
the
question
is
put,
who
shall
be
judge?
It
cannot
be
meant,
who
shall
decide
the
controversy;
every
one
knows
what
Jephtha
here
tells
us,
that
the
Lord
the
Judge
shall
judge.
Where
there
is
no
judge
on
earth,
the
appeal
lies
to
God
in
heaven.
That
question
then
cannot mean,
who
shall
judge,
whether
another
hath
put
himself
in
a
state
of
war
with
me,
and
whether
I may,
as
Jephtha did,
appeal
to
heaven
in
it?
of
that
I
myself
can
only
be
judge
in
my
own
conscience,
as
I
will
answer
it,
at
the
great
day,
to
the
supreme
judge
of
all
men.