CHAPTER VI. OF PATERNAL POWER.
Sect. 52.
IT
may
perhaps
be
censured
as
an
impertinent
criticism,
in
a discourse
of
this
nature,
to
find fault
with
words
and
names,
that
have
obtained
in
the
world:
and
yet
possibly
it
may
not
be
amiss
to
offer
new
ones,
when
the
old
are
apt
to
lead men
into
mistakes,
as
this
of
paternal
power probably has done,
which
seems
so
to
place
the
power
of
parents
over
their
children
wholly
in
the
father,
as
if
the
mother had
no
share
in
it; whereas,
if
we
consult
reason
or
revelation,
we
shall
find,
she
hath
an
equal title.
This
may
give
one
reason
to
ask,
whether
this
might
not
be
more
properly
called
parental
power?
for
whatever
obligation
nature
and
the
right
of
generation
lays
on
children,
it
must
certainly
bind
them
equal
to
both
the
concurrent
causes
of
it.
And
accordingly
we
see
the
positive
law
of
God
every
where
joins
them
together,
without
distinction,
when
it
commands
the
obedience
of
children,
Honour
thy father
and
thy mother, Exod. xx. 12. Whosoever curseth
his
father
or
his
mother, Lev. xx. 9.
Ye
shall
fear
every
man
his
mother
and
his
father, Lev. xix. 3. Children,
obey
your
parents, &c. Eph. vi. 1.
is
the
stile
of
the
Old
and
New
Testament. Sect. 53. Had
but
this
one
thing
been
well
considered,
without
looking
any
deeper
into
the
matter,
it
might
perhaps
have
kept men
from
running
into
those
gross mistakes,
they
have
made,
about
this
power
of
parents; which, however
it
might,
without
any
great
harshness,
bear
the
name
of
absolute
dominion,
and
regal
authority,
when
under
the
title
of
paternal
power
it
seemed
appropriated
to
the
father,
would
yet
have
founded
but
oddly,
and
in
the
very
name
shewn
the
absurdity,
if
this
supposed
absolute
power
over
children had been
called
parental;
and
thereby
have
discovered,
that
it
belonged
to
the
mother too:
for
it
will
but
very
ill
serve
the
turn
of
those
men,
who
contend
so
much
for
the
absolute
power
and
authority
of
the
fatherhood,
as
they
call
it,
that
the
mother
should
have
any
share
in
it;
and
it
would
have
but
ill
supported
the
monarchy
they
contend
for,
when
by
the
very
name
it
appeared,
that
that
fundamental
authority,
from
whence
they
would
derive
their
government
of
a single
person
only,
was
not
placed
in
one,
but
two
persons
jointly.
But
to
let
this
of
names
pass. Sect. 54.
Though
I
have
said above, Chap. II.
That
all
men
by
nature
are
equal, I cannot
be
supposed
to
understand
all
sorts
of
equality:
age
or
virtue
may
give
men a
just
precedency:
excellency
of
parts
and
merit
may
place
others
above
the
common
level:
birth
may
subject
some,
and
alliance
or
benefits others,
to
pay
an
observance
to
those
to
whom
nature, gratitude,
or
other
respects,
may
have
made
it
due:
and
yet
all
this
consists
with
the
equality,
which
all
men
are
in,
in
respect
of
jurisdiction
or
dominion
one
over
another;
which
was
the
equality
I
there
spoke
of,
as
proper
to
the
business
in
hand, being
that
equal right,
that
every
man
hath,
to
his
natural
freedom,
without
being
subjected
to
the
will
or
authority
of
any
other
man. Sect. 55. Children, I confess,
are
not
born
in
this
full
state
of
equality,
though
they
are
born
to
it.
Their
parents
have
a
sort
of
rule
and
jurisdiction
over
them,
when
they
come
into
the
world,
and
for
some
time after;
but
it
is
but
a
temporary
one.
The
bonds
of
this
subjection
are
like
the
swaddling
clothes
they
art
wrapt
up
in,
and
supported by,
in
the
weakness
of
their
infancy:
age
and
reason
as
they
grow up, loosen them,
till
at
length
they
drop
quite
off,
and
leave
a
man
at
his
own
free
disposal. Sect. 56.
Adam
was
created
a perfect man,
his
body
and
mind
in
full
possession
of
their
strength
and
reason,
and
so
was
capable,
from
the
first
instant
of
his
being
to
provide
for
his
own
support
and
preservation,
and
govern
his
actions
according
to
the
dictates
of
the
law
of
reason
which
God
had implanted
in
him.
From
him
the
world
is
peopled
with
his
descendants,
who
are
all
born
infants,
weak
and
helpless,
without
knowledge
or
understanding:
but
to
supply
the
defects
of
this
imperfect
state,
till
the
improvement
of
growth
and
age
hath removed them,
Adam
and
Eve,
and
after
them
all
parents
were,
by
the
law
of
nature,
under
an
obligation
to
preserve, nourish,
and
educate
the
children
they
had begotten;
not
as
their
own
workmanship,
but
the
workmanship
of
their
own
maker,
the
Almighty,
to
whom
they
were
to
be
accountable
for
them. Sect. 57.
The
law,
that
was
to
govern
Adam,
was
the
same
that
was
to
govern
all
his
posterity,
the
law
of
reason.
But
his
offspring
having
another
way
of
entrance
into
the
world,
different
from
him,
by
a
natural
birth,
that
produced
them
ignorant
and
without
the
use
of
reason,
they
were
not
presently
under
that
law;
for
no
body
can
be
under
a law,
which
is
not
promulgated
to
him;
and
this
law
being
promulgated
or
made
known
by
reason
only,
he
that
is
not
come
to
the
use
of
his
reason, cannot
be
said
to
be
under
this
law;
and
Adam's children, being
not
presently
as
soon
as
born
under
this
law
of
reason,
were
not
presently free:
for
law,
in
its
true notion,
is
not
so
much
the
limitation
as
the
direction
of
a
free
and
intelligent
agent
to
his
proper
interest,
and
prescribes
no
farther
than
is
for
the
general
good
of
those
under
that
law:
could
they
be
happier
without
it,
the
law,
as
an
useless thing,
would
of
itself
vanish;
and
that
ill
deserves
the
name
of
confinement
which
hedges
us
in
only
from
bogs
and
precipices.
So
that, however
it
may
be
mistaken,
the
end
of
law
is
not
to
abolish
or
restrain,
but
to
preserve
and
enlarge
freedom:
for
in
all
the
states
of
created
beings
capable
of
laws,
where
there
is
no
law,
there
is
no
freedom:
for
liberty
is,
to
be
free
from
restraint
and
violence
from
others;
which
cannot be,
where
there
is
no
law:
but
freedom
is
not,
as
we
are
told, a
liberty
for
every
man
to
do
what
he
lists: (for
who
could
be
free,
when
every
other
man's
humour
might
domineer
over
him?)
but
a
liberty
to
dispose,
and
order
as
he
lists,
his
person, actions, possessions,
and
his
whole
property,
within
the
allowance
of
those
laws
under
which
he
is,
and
therein
not
to
be
subject
to
the
arbitrary
will
of
another,
but
freely
follow
his
own. Sect. 58.
The
power, then,
that
parents
have
over
their
children,
arises
from
that
duty
which
is
incumbent
on
them,
to
take
care
of
their
off-spring,
during
the
imperfect
state
of
childhood.
To
inform
the
mind,
and
govern
the
actions
of
their
yet
ignorant
nonage,
till
reason
shall
take
its
place,
and
ease
them
of
that
trouble,
is
what
the
children want,
and
the
parents
are
bound to:
for
God
having
given
man
an
understanding
to
direct
his
actions, has allowed
him
a
freedom
of
will,
and
liberty
of
acting,
as
properly
belonging
thereunto,
within
the
bounds
of
that
law
he
is
under.
But
whilst
he
is
in
an
estate,
wherein
he
has
not
understanding
of
his
own
to
direct
his
will,
he
is
not
to
have
any
will
of
his
own
to
follow:
he
that
understands
for
him,
must
will
for
him
too;
he
must
prescribe
to
his
will,
and
regulate
his
actions;
but
when
he
comes
to
the
estate
that
made
his
father a freeman,
the
son
is
a
freeman
too. Sect. 59.
This
holds
in
all
the
laws
a
man
is
under,
whether
natural
or
civil.
Is
a
man
under
the
law
of
nature?
What
made
him
free
of
that
law?
what
gave
him
a
free
disposing
of
his
property, according
to
his
own
will,
within
the
compass
of
that
law? I answer, a
state
of
maturity
wherein
he
might
be
supposed
capable
to
know
that
law,
that
so
he
might
keep
his
actions
within
the
bounds
of
it.
When
he
has acquired
that
state,
he
is
presumed
to
know
how
far
that
law
is
to
be
his
guide,
and
how
far
he
may
make
use
of
his
freedom,
and
so
comes
to
have
it;
till
then,
some
body
else
must
guide
him,
who
is
presumed
to
know
how
far
the
law
allows
a liberty.
If
such
a
state
of
reason,
such
an
age
of
discretion
made
him
free,
the
same
shall
make
his
son
free
too.
Is
a
man
under
the
law
of
England?
What
made
him
free
of
that
law?
that
is,
to
have
the
liberty
to
dispose
of
his
actions
and
possessions
according
to
his
own
will,
within
the
permission
of
that
law? A
capacity
of
knowing
that
law;
which
is
supposed
by
that
law,
at
the
age
of
one
and
twenty
years,
and
in
some
cases
sooner.
If
this
made
the
father free,
it
shall
make
the
son
free
too.
Till
then
we
see
the
law
allows
the
son
to
have
no
will,
but
he
is
to
be
guided
by
the
will
of
his
father
or
guardian,
who
is
to
understand
for
him.
And
if
the
father die,
and
fail
to
substitute
a
deputy
in
his
trust;
if
he
hath
not
provided a tutor,
to
govern
his
son,
during
his
minority,
during
his
want
of
understanding,
the
law
takes
care
to
do
it;
some
other
must
govern
him,
and
be
a
will
to
him,
till
he
hath
attained
to
a
state
of
freedom,
and
his
understanding
be
fit
to
take
the
government
of
his
will.
But
after
that,
the
father
and
son
are
equally
free
as
much
as
tutor
and
pupil
after
nonage; equally
subjects
of
the
same
law
together,
without
any
dominion
left
in
the
father
over
the
life, liberty,
or
estate
of
his
son,
whether
they
be
only
in
the
state
and
under
the
law
of
nature,
or
under
the
positive
laws
of
an
established
government. Sect. 60.
But
if,
through
defects
that
may
happen
out
of
the
ordinary
course
of
nature,
any
one
comes
not
to
such
a
degree
of
reason,
wherein
he
might
be
supposed
capable
of
knowing
the
law,
and
so
living
within
the
rules
of
it,
he
is
never
capable
of
being a
free
man,
he
is
never
let
loose
to
the
disposure
of
his
own
will
(because
he
knows
no
bounds
to
it, has
not
understanding,
its
proper
guide)
but
is
continued
under
the
tuition
and
government
of
others,
all
the
time
his
own
understanding
is
uncapable
of
that
charge.
And
so
lunatics
and
ideots
are
never
set
free
from
the
government
of
their
parents; says Hooker, Eccl. Pol. lib. i. sec. 7.
All
which
seems
no
more
than
that
duty,
which
God
and
nature
has laid
on
man,
as
well
as
other
creatures,
to
preserve
their
offspring,
till
they
can
be
able
to
shift
for
themselves,
and
will
scarce
amount
to
an
instance
or
proof
of
parents
regal
authority. Sect. 61.
Thus
we
are
born
free,
as
we
are
born
rational;
not
that
we
have
actually
the
exercise
of
either: age,
that
brings
one,
brings
with
it
the
other
too.
And
thus
we
see
how
natural
freedom
and
subjection
to
parents
may
consist
together,
and
are
both
founded
on
the
same
principle. A
child
is
free
by
his
father's title,
by
his
father's understanding,
which
is
to
govern
him
till
he
hath
it
of
his
own.
The
freedom
of
a
man
at
years
of
discretion,
and
the
subjection
of
a
child
to
his
parents, whilst
yet
short
of
that
age,
are
so
consistent,
and
so
distinguishable,
that
the
most
blinded contenders
for
monarchy,
by
right
of
fatherhood, cannot
miss
this
difference;
the
most
obstinate
cannot
but
allow
their
consistency:
for
were
their
doctrine
all
true,
were
the
right
heir
of
Adam
now
known,
and
by
that
title settled a
monarch
in
his
throne,
invested
with
all
the
absolute
unlimited power Sir
Robert
Filmer talks of;
if
he
should
die
as
soon
as
his
heir
were
born,
must
not
the
child,
notwithstanding
he
were
never
so
free,
never
so
much
sovereign,
be
in
subjection
to
his
mother
and
nurse,
to
tutors
and
governors,
till
age
and
education
brought
him
reason
and
ability
to
govern
himself
and
others?
The
necessities
of
his
life,
the
health
of
his
body,
and
the
information
of
his
mind,
would
require
him
to
be
directed
by
the
will
of
others,
and
not
his
own;
and
yet
will
any
one
think,
that
this
restraint
and
subjection
were
inconsistent with,
or
spoiled
him
of
that
liberty
or
sovereignty
he
had a
right
to,
or
gave
away
his
empire
to
those
who
had
the
government
of
his
nonage?
This
government
over
him
only
prepared
him
the
better
and
sooner
for
it.
If
any
body
should
ask
me,
when
my
son
is
of
age
to
be
free? I
shall
answer,
just
when
his
monarch
is
of
age
to
govern.
But
at
what
time, says
the
judicious
Hooker, Eccl. Pol. l. i. sect. 6. a
man
may
be
said
to
have
attained
so
far
forth
the
use
of
reason,
as
sufficeth
to
make
him
capable
of
those
laws
whereby
he
is
then
bound
to
guide
his
actions:
this
is
a
great
deal
more
easy
for
sense
to
discern,
than
for
any
one
by
skill
and
learning
to
determine. Sect. 62. Common-wealths
themselves
take
notice of,
and
allow,
that
there
is
a time
when
men
are
to
begin
to
act
like
free
men,
and
therefore
till
that
time
require
not
oaths
of
fealty,
or
allegiance,
or
other
public owning of,
or
submission
to
the
government
of
their
countries. Sect. 63.
The
freedom
then
of
man,
and
liberty
of
acting according
to
his
own
will,
is
grounded
on
his
having
reason,
which
is
able
to
instruct
him
in
that
law
he
is
to
govern
himself
by,
and
make
him
know
how
far
he
is
left
to
the
freedom
of
his
own
will.
To
turn
him
loose
to
an
unrestrained liberty,
before
he
has
reason
to
guide
him,
is
not
the
allowing
him
the
privilege
of
his
nature
to
be
free;
but
to
thrust
him
out
amongst
brutes,
and
abandon
him
to
a
state
as
wretched,
and
as
much
beneath
that
of
a man,
as
their's.
This
is
that
which
puts
the
authority
into
the
parents
hands
to
govern
the
minority
of
their
children.
God
hath
made
it
their
business
to
employ
this
care
on
their
offspring,
and
hath
placed
in
them
suitable
inclinations
of
tenderness
and
concern
to
temper
this
power,
to
apply
it,
as
his
wisdom
designed
it,
to
the
children's good,
as
long
as
they
should
need
to
be
under
it. Sect. 64.
But
what
reason
can
hence
advance
this
care
of
the
parents
due
to
their
off-spring
into
an
absolute
arbitrary
dominion
of
the
father,
whose
power reaches
no
farther,
than
by
such
a discipline,
as
he
finds
most
effectual,
to
give
such
strength
and
health
to
their
bodies,
such
vigour
and
rectitude
to
their
minds,
as
may
best
fit
his
children
to
be
most
useful
to
themselves
and
others; and,
if
it
be
necessary
to
his
condition,
to
make
them
work,
when
they
are
able,
for
their
own
subsistence.
But
in
this
power
the
mother
too
has
her
share
with
the
father. Sect. 65. Nay,
this
power
so
little
belongs
to
the
father
by
any
peculiar
right
of
nature,
but
only
as
he
is
guardian
of
his
children,
that
when
he
quits
his
care
of
them,
he
loses
his
power
over
them,
which
goes
along
with
their
nourishment
and
education,
to
which
it
is
inseparably annexed;
and
it
belongs
as
much
to
the
foster-father
of
an
exposed
child,
as
to
the
natural
father
of
another.
So
little
power
does
the
bare
act
of
begetting
give
a
man
over
his
issue;
if
all
his
care
ends
there,
and
this
be
all
the
title
he
hath
to
the
name
and
authority
of
a father.
And
what
will
become
of
this
paternal
power
in
that
part
of
the
world,
where
one
woman
hath
more
than
one
husband
at
a time?
or
in
those
parts
of
America, where,
when
the
husband
and
wife
part,
which
happens
frequently,
the
children
are
all
left
to
the
mother,
follow
her,
and
are
wholly
under
her
care
and
provision?
If
the
father
die
whilst
the
children
are
young,
do
they
not
naturally
every
where
owe
the
same
obedience
to
their
mother,
during
their
minority,
as
to
their
father
were
he
alive?
and
will
any
one
say,
that
the
mother hath a legislative power
over
her
children?
that
she
can
make
standing rules,
which
shall
be
of
perpetual
obligation,
by
which
they
ought
to
regulate
all
the
concerns
of
their
property,
and
bound
their
liberty
all
the
course
of
their
lives?
or
can
she
inforce
the
observation
of
them
with
capital
punishments?
for
this
is
the
proper
power
of
the
magistrate,
of
which
the
father hath
not
so
much
as
the
shadow.
His
command
over
his
children
is
but
temporary,
and
reaches
not
their
life
or
property:
it
is
but
a
help
to
the
weakness
and
imperfection
of
their
nonage, a
discipline
necessary
to
their
education:
and
though
a father
may
dispose
of
his
own
possessions
as
he
pleases,
when
his
children
are
out
of
danger
of
perishing
for
want,
yet
his
power
extends
not
to
the
lives
or
goods,
which
either
their
own
industry,
or
another's
bounty
has
made
their's;
nor
to
their
liberty
neither,
when
they
are
once
arrived
to
the
infranchisement
of
the
years
of
discretion.
The
father's
empire
then
ceases,
and
he
can
from
thence
forwards
no
more
dispose
of
the
liberty
of
his
son,
than
that
of
any
other
man:
and
it
must
be
far
from
an
absolute
or
perpetual
jurisdiction,
from
which
a
man
may
withdraw
himself,
having
license
from
divine
authority
to
leave
father
and
mother,
and
cleave
to
his
wife. Sect. 66.
But
though
there
be
a time
when
a
child
comes
to
be
as
free
from
subjection
to
the
will
and
command
of
his
father,
as
the
father
himself
is
free
from
subjection
to
the
will
of
any
body
else,
and
they
are
each
under
no
other
restraint,
but
that
which
is
common
to
them
both,
whether
it
be
the
law
of
nature,
or
municipal
law
of
their
country;
yet
this
freedom
exempts
not
a
son
from
that
honour
which
he
ought,
by
the
law
of
God
and
nature,
to
pay
his
parents.
God
having
made
the
parents
instruments
in
his
great
design
of
continuing
the
race
of
mankind,
and
the
occasions
of
life
to
their
children;
as
he
hath laid
on
them
an
obligation
to
nourish, preserve,
and
bring
up
their
offspring;
so
he
has laid
on
the
children a
perpetual
obligation
of
honouring
their
parents,
which
containing
in
it
an
inward
esteem
and
reverence
to
be
shewn
by
all
outward
expressions, ties
up
the
child
from
any
thing
that
may
ever
injure
or
affront,
disturb
or
endanger,
the
happiness
or
life
of
those
from
whom
he
received his;
and
engages
him
in
all
actions
of
defence, relief,
assistance
and
comfort
of
those,
by
whose
means
he
entered
into
being,
and
has been
made
capable
of
any
enjoyments
of
life:
from
this
obligation
no
state,
no
freedom
can
absolve
children.
But
this
is
very
far
from
giving
parents
a power
of
command
over
their
children,
or
an
authority
to
make
laws
and
dispose
as
they
please
of
their
lives
or
liberties.
It
is
one
thing
to
owe
honour, respect,
gratitude
and
assistance;
another
to
require
an
absolute
obedience
and
submission.
The
honour
due
to
parents, a
monarch
in
his
throne
owes
his
mother;
and
yet
this
lessens
not
his
authority,
nor
subjects
him
to
her
government. Sect. 67.
The
subjection
of
a
minor
places
in
the
father a
temporary
government,
which
terminates
with
the
minority
of
the
child:
and
the
honour
due
from
a child,
places
in
the
parents
a
perpetual
right
to
respect, reverence, support
and
compliance too,
more
or
less,
as
the
father's care, cost,
and
kindness
in
his
education, has been
more
or
less.
This
ends
not
with
minority,
but
holds
in
all
parts
and
conditions
of
a man's life.
The
want
of
distinguishing
these
two
powers, viz.
that
which
the
father hath
in
the
right
of
tuition,
during
minority,
and
the
right
of
honour
all
his
life,
may
perhaps
have
caused
a
great
part
of
the
mistakes
about
this
matter:
for
to
speak
properly
of
them,
the
first
of
these
is
rather
the
privilege
of
children,
and
duty
of
parents,
than
any
prerogative
of
paternal
power.
The
nourishment
and
education
of
their
children
is
a
charge
so
incumbent
on
parents
for
their
children's good,
that
nothing
can
absolve
them
from
taking
care
of
it:
and
though
the
power
of
commanding
and
chastising
them
go
along
with
it,
yet
God
hath woven
into
the
principles
of
human
nature
such
a tenderness
for
their
off-spring,
that
there
is
little
fear
that
parents
should
use
their
power
with
too
much
rigour;
the
excess
is
seldom
on
the
severe
side,
the
strong
byass
of
nature
drawing
the
other
way.
And
therefore
God
almighty
when
he
would
express
his
gentle
dealing
with
the
Israelites,
he
tells
them,
that
though
he
chastened
them,
he
chastened
them
as
a
man
chastens
his
son, Deut. viii. 5. i.e.
with
tenderness
and
affection,
and
kept
them
under
no
severer
discipline
than
what
was
absolutely
best
for
them,
and
had been
less
kindness
to
have
slackened.
This
is
that
power
to
which
children
are
commanded
obedience,
that
the
pains
and
care
of
their
parents
may
not
be
increased,
or
ill
rewarded. Sect. 68.
On
the
other
side,
honour
and
support,
all
that
which
gratitude
requires
to
return
for
the
benefits received
by
and
from
them,
is
the
indispensable
duty
of
the
child,
and
the
proper
privilege
of
the
parents.
This
is
intended
for
the
parents
advantage,
as
the
other
is
for
the
child's;
though
education,
the
parents
duty,
seems
to
have
most
power,
because
the
ignorance
and
infirmities
of
childhood
stand
in
need
of
restraint
and
correction;
which
is
a
visible
exercise
of
rule,
and
a
kind
of
dominion.
And
that
duty
which
is
comprehended
in
the
word
honour,
requires
less
obedience,
though
the
obligation
be
stronger
on
grown,
than
younger
children:
for
who
can
think
the
command, Children
obey
your
parents,
requires
in
a man,
that
has children
of
his
own,
the
same
submission
to
his
father,
as
it
does
in
his
yet
young
children
to
him;
and
that
by
this
precept
he
were
bound
to
obey
all
his
father's commands, if,
out
of
a conceit
of
authority,
he
should
have
the
indiscretion
to
treat
him
still
as
a boy? Sect. 69.
The
first
part
then
of
paternal
power,
or
rather
duty,
which
is
education,
belongs
so
to
the
father,
that
it
terminates
at
a
certain
season;
when
the
business
of
education
is
over,
it
ceases
of
itself,
and
is
also
alienable before:
for
a
man
may
put
the
tuition
of
his
son
in
other
hands;
and
he
that
has
made
his
son
an
apprentice
to
another, has discharged him,
during
that
time,
of
a
great
part
of
his
obedience
both
to
himself
and
to
his
mother.
But
all
the
duty
of
honour,
the
other
part,
remains
never
the
less
entire
to
them;
nothing
can
cancel
that:
it
is
so
inseparable
from
them
both,
that
the
father's
authority
cannot
dispossess
the
mother
of
this
right,
nor
can
any
man
discharge
his
son
from
honouring
her
that
bore him.
But
both
these
are
very
far
from
a power
to
make
laws,
and
enforcing
them
with
penalties,
that
may
reach estate, liberty,
limbs
and
life.
The
power
of
commanding
ends
with
nonage;
and
though,
after
that,
honour
and
respect, support
and
defence,
and
whatsoever
gratitude
can
oblige
a
man
to,
for
the
highest
benefits
he
is
naturally
capable
of,
be
always
due
from
a
son
to
his
parents;
yet
all
this
puts
no
scepter
into
the
father's hand,
no
sovereign
power
of
commanding.
He
has
no
dominion
over
his
son's property,
or
actions;
nor
any
right,
that
his
will
should
prescribe
to
his
son's
in
all
things; however
it
may
become
his
son
in
many
things,
not
very
inconvenient
to
him
and
his
family,
to
pay
a
deference
to
it. Sect. 70. A
man
may
owe
honour
and
respect
to
an
ancient,
or
wise
man; defence
to
his
child
or
friend;
relief
and
support
to
the
distressed;
and
gratitude
to
a benefactor,
to
such
a degree,
that
all
he
has,
all
he
can
do, cannot sufficiently
pay
it:
but
all
these
give
no
authority,
no
right
to
any
one,
of
making
laws
over
him
from
whom
they
are
owing.
And
it
is
plain,
all
this
is
due
not
only
to
the
bare
title
of
father;
not
only
because,
as
has been said,
it
is
owing
to
the
mother too;
but
because
these
obligations
to
parents,
and
the
degrees
of
what
is
required
of
children,
may
be
varied
by
the
different
care
and
kindness,
trouble
and
expence,
which
is
often
employed
upon
one
child
more
than
another. Sect. 71.
This
shews
the
reason
how
it
comes
to
pass,
that
parents
in
societies,
where
they
themselves
are
subjects,
retain
a power
over
their
children,
and
have
as
much
right
to
their
subjection,
as
those
who
are
in
the
state
of
nature.
Which
could
not
possibly be,
if
all
political
power
were
only
paternal,
and
that
in
truth
they
were
one
and
the
same
thing:
for
then,
all
paternal
power being
in
the
prince,
the
subject
could
naturally
have
none
of
it.
But
these
two
powers,
political
and
paternal,
are
so
perfectly
distinct
and
separate;
are
built
upon
so
different
foundations,
and
given
to
so
different
ends,
that
every
subject
that
is
a father, has
as
much
a
paternal
power
over
his
children,
as
the
prince has
over
his:
and
every
prince,
that
has parents,
owes
them
as
much
filial
duty
and
obedience,
as
the
meanest
of
his
subjects
do
to
their's;
and
can
therefore
contain
not
any
part
or
degree
of
that
kind
of
dominion,
which
a prince
or
magistrate
has
over
his
subject. Sect. 72.
Though
the
obligation
on
the
parents
to
bring
up
their
children,
and
the
obligation
on
children
to
honour
their
parents,
contain
all
the
power
on
the
one
hand,
and
submission
on
the
other,
which
are
proper
to
this
relation,
yet
there
is
another
power ordinarily
in
the
father, whereby
he
has a
tie
on
the
obedience
of
his
children;
which
tho'
it
be
common
to
him
with
other
men,
yet
the
occasions
of
shewing
it,
almost
consich tho'
it
be
common
to
him
with
other
men,
yet
the
occasions
of
shewing
it,
almost
constantly happening
to
fathers
in
their
private
families,
and
the
instances
of
it
elsewhere
being rare,
and
less
taken notice of,
it
passes
in
the
world
for
a
part
of
paternal
jurisdiction.
And
this
is
the
power men generally
have
to
bestow
their
estates
on
those
who
please
them
best;
the
possession
of
the
father being
the
expectation
and
inheritance
of
the
children, ordinarily
in
certain
proportions, according
to
the
law
and
custom
of
each
country;
yet
it
is
commonly
in
the
father's power
to
bestow
it
with
a
more
sparing
or
liberal hand, according
as
the
behaviour
of
this
or
that
child
hath
comported
with
his
will
and
humour. Sect. 73.
This
is
no
small
tie
on
the
obedience
of
children:
and
there
being
always
annexed
to
the
enjoyment
of
land, a
submission
to
the
government
of
the
country,
of
which
that
land
is
a part;
it
has been commonly supposed,
that
a father
could
oblige
his
posterity
to
that
government,
of
which
he
himself
was
a subject,
and
that
his
compact
held
them; whereas,
it
being
only
a
necessary
condition
annexed
to
the
land,
and
the
inheritance
of
an
estate
which
is
under
that
government, reaches
only
those
who
will
take
it
on
that
condition,
and
so
is
no
natural
tie
or
engagement,
but
a
voluntary
submission:
for
every
man's children being
by
nature
as
free
as
himself,
or
any
of
his
ancestors
ever
were, may, whilst
they
are
in
that
freedom,
choose
what
society
they
will
join
themselves
to,
what
commonwealth
they
will
put
themselves
under.
But
if
they
will
enjoy
the
inheritance
of
their
ancestors,
they
must
take
it
on
the
same
terms
their
ancestors
had it,
and
submit
to
all
the
conditions
annexed
to
such
a possession.
By
this
power
indeed
fathers
oblige
their
children
to
obedience
to
themselves,
even
when
they
are
past minority,
and
most
commonly
too
subject
them
to
this
or
that
political
power:
but
neither
of
these
by
any
peculiar
right
of
fatherhood,
but
by
the
reward
they
have
in
their
hands
to
inforce
and
recompence
such
a compliance;
and
is
no
more
power
than
what
a
French
man
has
over
an
English
man,
who
by
the
hopes
of
an
estate
he
will
leave
him,
will
certainly
have
a
strong
tie
on
his
obedience:
and
if,
when
it
is
left him,
he
will
enjoy
it,
he
must
certainly
take
it
upon
the
conditions
annexed
to
the
possession
of
land
in
that
country
where
it
lies,
whether
it
be
France
or
England. Sect. 74.
To
conclude
then, tho'
the
father's power
of
commanding
extends
no
farther
than
the
minority
of
his
children,
and
to
a
degree
only
fit
for
the
discipline
and
government
of
that
age;
and
tho'
that
honour
and
respect,
and
all
that
which
the
Latins
called
piety,
which
they
indispensably
owe
to
their
parents
all
their
life-time,
and
in
all
estates,
with
all
that
support
and
defence
is
due
to
them,
gives
the
father
no
power
of
governing, i.e.
making
laws
and
enacting
penalties
on
his
children;
though
by
all
this
he
has
no
dominion
over
the
property
or
actions
of
his
son:
yet
it
is
obvious
to
conceive
how
easy
it
was,
in
the
first
ages
of
the
world,
and
in
places
still,
where
the
thinness
of
people
gives
families
leave
to
separate
into
unpossessed quarters,
and
they
have
room
to
remove
or
plant
themselves
in
yet
vacant
habitations,
for
the
father
of
the
family
to
become
the
prince
of
it;*
he
had been a ruler
from
the
beginning
of
the
infancy
of
his
children:
and
since
without
some
government
it
would
be
hard
for
them
to
live
together,
it
was
likeliest
it
should,
by
the
express
or
tacit
consent
of
the
children
when
they
were
grown up,
be
in
the
father,
where
it
seemed
without
any
change
barely
to
continue;
when
indeed
nothing
more
was
required
to
it,
than
the
permitting
the
father
to
exercise
alone,
in
his
family,
that
executive
power
of
the
law
of
nature,
which
every
free
man
naturally hath,
and
by
that
permission
resigning
up
to
him
a monarchical power, whilst
they
remained
in
it.
But
that
this
was
not
by
any
paternal
right,
but
only
by
the
consent
of
his
children,
is
evident
from
hence,
that
no
body
doubts,
but
if
a stranger,
whom
chance
or
business
had brought
to
his
family, had
there
killed
any
of
his
children,
or
committed
any
other
fact,
he
might
condemn
and
put
him
to
death,
or
other-wise
have
punished
him,
as
well
as
any
of
his
children;
which
it
was
impossible
he
should
do
by
virtue
of
any
paternal
authority
over
one
who
was
not
his
child,
but
by
virtue
of
that
executive
power
of
the
law
of
nature, which,
as
a man,
he
had a
right
to:
and
he
alone
could
punish
him
in
his
family,
where
the
respect
of
his
children had laid
by
the
exercise
of
such
a power,
to
give
way
to
the
dignity
and
authority
they
were
willing
should
remain
in
him,
above
the
rest
of
his
family. (*It
is
no
improbable
opinion
therefore,
which
the
archphilosopher
was
of,
that
the
chief
person
in
every
houshold
was
always,
as
it
were, a king:
so
when
numbers
of
housholds
joined
themselves
in
civil
societies
together, kings
were
the
first
kind
of
governors
amongst
them,
which
is
also,
as
it
seemeth,
the
reason
why
the
name
of
fathers
continued
still
in
them, who,
of
fathers,
were
made
rulers;
as
also
the
ancient
custom
of
governors
to
do
as
Melchizedec,
and
being kings,
to
exercise
the
office
of
priests,
which
fathers
did
at
the
first,
grew
perhaps
by
the
same
occasion. Howbeit,
this
is
not
the
only
kind
of
regiment
that
has been received
in
the
world.
The
inconveniences
of
one
kind
have
caused
sundry
others
to
be
devised;
so
that
in
a word,
all
public regiment,
of
what
kind
soever, seemeth evidently
to
have
risen
from
the
deliberate
advice,
consultation
and
composition
between
men,
judging
it
convenient
and
behoveful;
there
being
no
impossibility
in
nature
considered
by
itself,
but
that
man
might
have
lived
without
any
public regiment, Hooker's Eccl. Pol. lib. i. sect. 10.) Sect. 75.
Thus
it
was
easy,
and
almost
natural
for
children,
by
a tacit,
and
scarce
avoidable consent,
to
make
way
for
the
father's
authority
and
government.
They
had been accustomed
in
their
childhood
to
follow
his
direction,
and
to
refer
their
little
differences
to
him,
and
when
they
were
men,
who
fitter
to
rule
them?
Their
little
properties,
and
less
covetousness,
seldom
afforded
greater
controversies;
and
when
any
should
arise,
where
could
they
have
a fitter umpire
than
he,
by
whose
care
they
had
every
one
been
sustained
and
brought up,
and
who
had a tenderness
for
them
all?
It
is
no
wonder
that
they
made
no
distinction
betwixt
minority
and
full
age;
nor
looked
after
one
and
twenty,
or
any
other
age
that
might
make
them
the
free
disposers
of
themselves
and
fortunes,
when
they
could
have
no
desire
to
be
out
of
their
pupilage:
the
government
they
had been under,
during
it,
continued
still
to
be
more
their
protection
than
restraint;
and
they
could
no
where
find a
greater
security
to
their
peace, liberties,
and
fortunes,
than
in
the
rule
of
a father. Sect. 76.
Thus
the
natural
fathers
of
families,
by
an
insensible
change, became
the
politic
monarchs
of
them
too:
and
as
they
chanced
to
live
long,
and
leave
able
and
worthy
heirs,
for
several
successions,
or
otherwise;
so
they
laid
the
foundations
of
hereditary,
or
elective
kingdoms,
under
several
constitutions
and
mannors, according
as
chance, contrivance,
or
occasions
happened
to
mould
them.
But
if
princes
have
their
titles
in
their
fathers right,
and
it
be
a
sufficient
proof
of
the
natural
right
of
fathers
to
political
authority,
because
they
commonly
were
those
in
whose
hands
we
find,
de
facto,
the
exercise
of
government: I say,
if
this
argument
be
good,
it
will
as
strongly
prove,
that
all
princes,
nay
princes only,
ought
to
be
priests,
since
it
is
as
certain,
that
in
the
beginning,
the
father
of
the
family
was
priest,
as
that
he
was
ruler
in
his
own
houshold.